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NOTE
Can We Calculate Fairness and Reasonableness?
Determining What Satisfies the Fair Cross-Section
Requirement of the Sixth Amendment
Colleen P. Fitzharris*
The Impartial Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that the venire
from which the state and the defendant draw a twelve-person petit jury be a
fair cross-section of the community. The Supreme Court announced a three-
prong test in Duren v. Missouri to help courts determine whether there has
been a Sixth Amendment violation: (1) whether a distinctive group in the
community was excluded; (2) whether the venire was not a fair and reasona-
ble representation of the county population as a whole; and (3) whether that
underrepresentation was the result of systematic exclusion. When evaluating
the second prong, courts routinely turn to statistical measurements. The four
statistical tests that courts have used, including the disparity-of-risk test that
the Michigan Supreme Court recently employed in People v. Bryant, fall short
of adequately addressing the second prong. This Note proposes two solutions.
First, courts should consider the comparative-disparity-of-risk test, borrowed
from the medical malpractice loss-of-chance doctrine, as the best measure of
whether underrepresentative venires are not fair and reasonable in relation to
the community. Second, judges should consider whether a distinctive group in
the community has systematically been excluded before turning to the question
of whether an underrepresentative venire is fair and reasonable in a given
community. After considering whether a distinctive group has been excluded,
courts may employ the statistical tests as part of their analysis but should not
use thresholds to determine what is fair and reasonable.
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Introduction
For over 16 months, a computer error in Kent County, Michigan, ex-
cluded nearly 75% of the county’s eligible juror population from jury ser-
vice.1 Of the 454,000 Kent County names and addresses on the master list of
those eligible for jury service, only 118,000 potential jurors received sum-
monses.2 Of those people who received jury summonses, the majority of
recipients were from zip codes outside the Grand Rapids metro area, exclud-
ing a high percentage of the county’s black population that lives in Grand
Rapids.3 If the computer program had been working properly and Kent
County had mailed jury summonses to the whole population for the first 3
months of 2002, then 322 summonses would have been sent to black peo-
ple.4 Instead, only 163 black people received jury summonses—half the ex-
pected number.5 The black population of Kent County as a whole is
approximately 8.25% of the county’s total population.6 Four percent of the
veniremembers in Kent County were black.7
1. Doug Guthrie & Kyla King, Kent [County, Michigan] Admits Glitch in Jury Selection,
Grand Rapids Press, July 30, 2002, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/72
4777/posts.
2. Id.
3. Amicus Curiae Brief of Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan at 2–3, People v.
Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. 2012) (No. 141741), 2011 WL 5893816 at *2–3.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
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In January 2002, a jury selected from 45 veniremembers8—1 black, 1
Latino, and 43 white—convicted Raymond Lee Bryant,9 a black man.10 Dur-
ing the selection of the petit jury,11 Bryant’s attorney noticed the venire’s
skewed composition and made a timely objection,12 arguing that the venire
was not reasonably representative of the community13 as required by the
Sixth Amendment.14 The trial court denied the motion—a decision that ul-
timately reached the Michigan Supreme Court.15
The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Bryant had not estab-
lished a violation of the fair cross-section requirement. 16 Its decision rested
on the second prong of the prima facie fair cross-section test: whether the
excluded group’s representation in the venire was “fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community.”17 The court con-
sidered four statistical tests to determine whether the representation of black
people was fair and reasonable, including a test that no other court had
previously applied—the disparity-of-risk test.18 This Note argues that each
of these four prevailing statistical tests for underrepresentation is unwork-
able, and it proposes two solutions.
Part I examines the history and purpose of the fair cross-section re-
quirement. Part II describes and explains the strengths and weaknesses of
the four statistical tests courts use to determine whether a venire is fair and
reasonable and argues that the existing approaches are insufficient because
they are not broadly applicable and do not comport with the purposes of the
fair cross-section requirement. Part III proposes two new approaches. Sec-
tion III.A argues that courts should consider the comparative-disparity-of-
risk test because it is a better measure of the effect of the State’s systematic
exclusion of a distinctive group. Section III.B argues that relying exclusively
8. A “veniremember” is a person who serves on a “venire.” For the purposes of this
Note, a “venire” is a larger group of jurors from which the 12-member jury is selected through
voir dire.
9. People v. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Mich. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664
(2012).
10. Biographical Information of Raymond Lee Bryant, Mich. Department Correc-
tions, http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=396520 (last visited
May 17, 2013).
11. A “petit jury” is the group of 12 people who ultimately hear the evidence presented
and render a verdict.
12. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 128.
13. A venire is “representative” when it contains roughly proportionate numbers of
people from each distinctive group in the county. “Community” refers to all the people in the
relevant county who are eligible to serve as jurors according to state law.
14. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
15. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 126.
16. Id. at 145, 147.
17. Id. at 135, 145 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)) (holding that
there was no dispute that black people are a distinctive group and that the computer glitch
resulted in the systematic exclusion of black veniremembers).
18. Id. at 138–45, 142 n.92. The other tests considered were the absolute-disparity test,
the comparative-disparity test, and the standard-deviation test. Id.
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on statistical tests and thresholds is inappropriate for determining whether
or not venires are underrepresentative in relation to the community. Thus, it
recommends that courts first look to whether the defendant has proven that
the jury-selection process systematically excluded a distinctive group in the
community before considering whether there was fairness and reasonable-
ness. Only then should courts consider the various statistical tests to guide—
but not determine—the outcome of a defendant’s fair cross-section claim.
I. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement
This Part examines the purposes of the fair cross-section requirement
that guides the jury-selection process. Section I.A explains the origins of the
requirement and how a defendant may bring a prima facie challenge regard-
ing the composition of the venire. Section I.B explores the underlying ratio-
nales for the fair cross-section requirement and suggests that any test that
courts employ to determine whether there has been a violation of the Sixth
Amendment should serve this purpose.
A. The Fair Cross-Section Test
The fair cross-section requirement derives from the Constitution’s guar-
antee of an impartial jury. The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law.”19 The Supreme Court
has long held that the Impartial Jury Clause requires that the veniremembers
be “drawn from a fair cross section of the community.” 20
To prove a fair cross-section violation, the defendant must demonstrate
that a systematic exclusion of a distinctive group resulted in an unreasonable
underrepresentation of that group in his venire.21 The Court has set forth a
three-part test, known as the Duren test, to establish a prima facie violation
of the fair cross-section requirement:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.22
Courts usually focus on race and gender when they address the first
prong and determine whether the system of summoning jurors excludes a
“distinctive group.”23 The second prong, which is the subject of this Note,
19. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
20. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
21. The requirement applies to venires, not petit juries. Id. at 538.
22. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
23. The Equal Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny when groups are classified on
the basis of race, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
December 2013] Can We Calculate Fairness and Reasonableness? 493
asks whether the underrepresentation is too large—unfair and unreasona-
ble—in relation to the demographic composition of the community.24 The
Court has provided no further guidance regarding the second prong of the
Duren test.25 Finally, to prove that a distinctive group was “systematically
excluded” for the test’s third prong, the defendant does not need to show
invidious discrimination or discriminatory intent.26 Rather, the question is
whether the cause of the underrepresentation was “inherent in the particular
jury-selection process utilized.”27
Once the defendant has presented sufficient evidence to satisfy these
three prongs and establish a prima facie violation, the state then bears the
burden of demonstrating that the policy or procedure resulting in the dis-
proportionate exclusion of a distinctive group is appropriately tailored to a
significant state interest.28
B. Purposes of the Fair Cross-Section Requirement
The justifications for the fair cross-section requirement are intertwined
with the benefits of jury trials. The jury is important to the American justice
system for three reasons. First, the jury is a check on the government’s exer-
cise of power; it is an “inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”29
Second, it serves three communitarian functions by providing (1) a mecha-
nism to include public participation in the judicial process, (2) a means to
educate the public on the workings of the criminal justice system,30 and (3) a
720 (2007), and intermediate scrutiny when the classification is by sex, see, e.g., United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). When determining whether a group is a “distinctive
group” within the meaning of the fair cross-section requirement, courts have limited their
scope to race and sex. E.g., United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 797–98 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that Asians are a distinctive group); United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“There is little question that both Blacks and Hispanics are ‘distinctive’ groups in
the community for purposes of [the fair cross-section] test.”); United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d
21, 23 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498–99 (1972)) (holding that blacks
are a per se distinctive group under the first prong of Duren); Stephen E. Reil, Comment, Who
Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Popula-
tions Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 201, 209–14.
24. In Taylor, the Court found that when women comprised 53% of the population but
only 10% of the venire, the jury pool failed to be reasonably representative of the community
as a whole. 419 U.S. at 524, 537–38. Similarly, in Duren, the Court held that when women
comprised 54% of the population but only 15% of the venire, the venire was not a fair and
reasonable representation of the community. 439 U.S. at 364–66.
25. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393 (2010).
26. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 989 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 366).
27. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366.
28. Id. at 367–68, 370.
29. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
30. Alexis de Tocqueville most clearly expressed these first two communitarian func-
tions of jury service in Democracy in America:
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way to ensure the community’s confidence in the outcome of criminal tri-
als.31 Finally, juries express the community’s values and the populist view-
point.32 The benefits of having diverse viewpoints to express the will of the
community are most apparent when the jury votes to acquit a defendant
because the jurors believe the law is unjust or unconstitutional.33 The fair
cross-section requirement protects the jury’s utility and all of its functions.
First, where juries are intended to serve as a check on the government’s
exercise of power, the fair cross-section requirement assures that the state
cannot “stack the deck” in its favor by eliminating certain groups it believes
are predisposed to favor the defendant.34 While the risk that peremptory
challenges may result in a less impartial jury is well known,35 the risks inher-
ent in the rules and mechanisms for compiling the jury list are also signifi-
cant.36 The Sixth Amendment goes further than the Equal Protection
Clause’s protection against intentional discrimination37: it protects the
defendant from unintentional discrimination—like the computer glitch in
[T]he institution of the jury raises the people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to the
bench of judicial authority. . . . [It] invests the people, or that class of citizens, with the
direction of society.
. . . .
. . . The jury . . . invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the
duties which they are bound to discharge towards society; and the part which they take in
the Government. By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs which are not exclu-
sively their own, it rubs off that individual egotism which is the rust of society.
. . . .
I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but I am certain it
is highly beneficial to those who decide the litigation; and I look upon it as one of the
most efficacious means for the education of the people which society can employ.
Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 334–37 (Henry Reeve trans., Schocken
1st ed. 1961).
31. George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the
Rights of the Accused, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 808 (1995). The Court expressly endorsed the view
that participation in jury deliberations increases the community’s confidence in the outcome
of verdicts in Balzac v. Porto Rico: “One of its greatest benefits is in the security it gives the
people that they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the judicial system of the country
can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.” 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922).
32. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 83–88 (1998).
33. Id. at 98.
34. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990). The petit jury is intended “to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.” Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 9 passim (1997).
36. Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process (pt. V), 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1557, 1562–63 (1988).
37. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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Bryant’s case38—for the benefit of the individual defendant, the jurors, and
the criminal process as a whole.
Representative juries also advance the communitarian functions of ju-
ries by ensuring that the community believes that the proceedings are fair
and impartial and by bolstering community confidence in the verdict. Jury
composition influences the observers’ and participants’ perception about the
fairness of the criminal proceeding.39 To ensure that the public and the ac-
cused believe that the proceedings are fair, the jury must “ ‘be a body truly
representative of the community’ . . . and not the organ of any special group
or class.”40 Indeed, the statement “[t]he defendant was tried by an all-white
jury” conjures disturbing images of some of the abuses of the criminal jus-
tice system.41 If a defendant never had a chance at a representative jury, then
the process of empaneling a petit jury from an underrepresentative group
will likely raise doubts in the minds of the accused and the public about the
fairness of the proceedings. Moreover, the exclusion of groups in the com-
munity could substantially undermine faith in the judicial system as a
whole.
Finally, the fair cross-section requirement recognizes that the ultimate
goal of the Impartial Jury Clause and its protections is to select an impartial
petit jury that protects and expresses the collective knowledge, wisdom, and
values of the community. Adequately representing community values re-
quires diversity because such values are the result of the interplay between
the different groups that make up the community as a whole.42 Although the
fair cross-section requirement does not compel a representative petit jury,43 it
recognizes that a representative petit jury is more likely when it is drawn
from a representative venire and thus more likely to reflect the interplay of
the ideas and values in the community. If the fair cross-section requirement
is to have any teeth, then it must take into account the ways in which diverse
viewpoints create a more impartial jury. All-white juries are more prone to
38. Amicus Curiae Brief of Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan, supra note 3, at 2,
2011 WL 5893816, at *2.
39. Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in
the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1177, 1183–84
(1994) (noting that the composition of the jury is a procedural feature that affects the public’s
perception of the fairness of the proceedings, and when proceedings are deemed fair, those
involved are more likely to accept the outcome).
40. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 85–86 (1942)).
41. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 Duke L.J. 704, 704 (1995).
42. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531–32.
43. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
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convict black, Hispanic, or Native American defendants.44 “[T]he mere ex-
pectation of participating in a racially diverse jury can be influential.”45 Di-
versity on a jury allows “a group to consider a wider range of perspectives
and information.”46
Any consideration of the fair-and-reasonable-representation prong of
the fair cross-section requirement must consider these three underlying pur-
poses of the fair cross-section requirement and their grounding in the Im-
partial Jury Clause: providing a check on governmental power, ensuring
communal confidence in the outcome of a jury verdict, and guaranteeing
that the verdict will reflect the values of the community as a whole.
II. Statistical Proof of Unfair and Unreasonable Venires
The second prong of the Duren test suggests a statistical comparison
between the distinctive group’s proportional representation in the venire
and its proportional representation in the population.47 Since Duren, lower
courts have struggled to find an appropriate statistical measure for under-
representation.48 Four tests have emerged: the absolute-disparity test, the
comparative-disparity test, the statistical-deviation test, and the disparity-of-
risk test. This Part explores each of these tests in turn. Section II.A describes
the absolute-disparity test and concludes that threshold application of the
test protects the principles of the fair cross-section requirement insuffi-
ciently because it treats differently situated communities similarly and
thereby allows for distinctive groups to be entirely excluded from the master
lists. Section II.B addresses the comparative-disparity test and suggests that
it is unsatisfactory because it overstates the magnitude of the under-
representation for very small groups in the community. Section II.C explains
the standard-deviation test and agrees with other scholars that the test is not
an appropriate measure for the second prong of the fair cross-section test
because it only highlights flaws in the selection process but does not provide
any information about how the venires compare to the community. It con-
cludes that the standard-deviation test is the most appropriate for determin-
ing whether a jury-selection process has systematically excluded distinctive
groups. Section II.D addresses and critiques the newest test the courts have
44. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 597, 599 (2006).
45. Id. at 598–99.
46. Id. at 600.
47. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (“[T]he representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community . . . .” (emphasis added)).
48. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393 (2010) (“[N]either Duren nor any other
decision of this Court specifies the method or test courts must use to measure the representa-
tion of distinctive groups in jury pools. The courts below have noted three methods . . . . Each
test is imperfect.”).
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used, the disparity-of-risk test, and concludes that it, like the absolute-dis-
parity test and the comparative-disparity test, is an unsatisfactory measure
of the fairness and reasonableness of a venire in relation to the community.
A. The Absolute-Disparity Test
The most widely accepted test for underrepresentation, and by far the
simplest test, is the absolute-disparity test.49 It measures the distinctive
group’s underrepresentation by subtracting the percentage representation of
that group on the average venire from the percentage representation of that
group in the overall community.50 The following simple equation expresses
the absolute-disparity test:
To calculate v, the defendant would select some period over which to
sample venires.51 This might be the time period during which some defect
existed—like the computer glitch—or it might be an arbitrary period of
time. Suppose the period is 6 months. 52 One would look at each 45-person
venire during that period—say 20 venires for a total of 900 veniremembers.
49. See Delgado v. Dennehy, 503 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425–26 (D. Mass. 2007) (surveying
the cases).
50. Richard M. Re´, Commentary, Jury Poker: A Statistical Analysis of the Fair Cross-
Section Requirement, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 533, 544–45 (2011); Peter A. Detre, Note, A
Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the Composition of the Jury Wheel, 103 Yale L.J.
1913, 1917 (1994).
51. For the purpose of this Note, all calculations will assume that a court must examine
the demographic composition of venires over time, as the Michigan Supreme Court held in
People v. Bryant. 822 N.W.2d 124, 136–37 (Mich. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664 (2012)
(“[W]hen considering whether representation is fair and reasonable, Duren requires a court to
evaluate the composition of venires over a significant time period rather than just the defen-
dant’s individual venire.”). The Michigan Supreme Court’s holding is consistent with that of
many other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 160 F.3d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Ap-
pellants . . . must show more than that their particular panel was unrepresentative.”); United
States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1985) (“It appears to us that the Supreme
Court’s use of the plural in setting up the Duren test is a clear indication that a violation of the
fair cross-section requirement cannot be premised upon proof of underrepresentation in a
single jury.”).
52. In Bryant, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the reviewing court must
consider the composition of multiple “venires over a significant time period” when considering
the second prong of Duren. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 136–37. The court did not provide gui-
dance about what a “significant time period” is for the purposes of evaluating venires. See id.
The court relied on the data in Kent County over a 3-month period. Id. at 138. The 6-month
period used here is intended to illustrate the process without arguing that courts should always
consider data from a 6-month range.
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Suppose 45 of those veniremembers were black. To arrive at v, or the pro-
portion of blacks on the average venire, one would then take the ratio of the
total number of black veniremembers against the total number of
veniremembers. So, in this example, v is 5 percentage points. If the black
population of a county comprises 15% of the community, then the absolute
disparity would be 10 percentage points (15% minus 5%).
The Table below illustrates the practical consequences of various abso-
lute disparities. It shows the black population in several Michigan counties.
It then indicates the number of black veniremembers that would end up on
the average 45-person venire if the absolute disparity was 0, 5, 10, and 20
percentage points. Most of the figures indicate a range if the expected num-
ber of black veniremembers falls between two integers. Note that it is impos-
sible to have an absolute disparity greater than the proportion of black
people in the community. Thus, in Alger County, for example, there are no
figures for absolute disparities in the 10% and 20% columns.53
Table 1.
Hypothetical Black Veniremembers in 45-Person Venires






Hypothetical Absolute Disparities 
0% 5% 10% 20% 
Wayne County 40.3% 18–19 15–16 13–14 9–10 
Genesee County 20.9% 9–10 7–8 4–5 0–1 
Alger County 6.6% 2–3 0–1 N/A N/A 
Marquette County 1.8% 0–1 N/A N/A N/A 
The absolute-disparity test is attractive because of its mathematical sim-
plicity and because the Court tacitly accepted this approach in Duren.54 If
courts employ the absolute-disparity test to find significant under-
representation, one question remains: How much of the distinct group’s
population may be excluded before a violation of the Sixth Amendment has
53. All data used for Table 1 are based on data collected in State and County QuickFacts,
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited May 17, 2013).
For Wayne County, see State and County QuickFacts: Wayne County, Michigan, U.S. Census
Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/26163.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2013,
2:14 PM). For Genesee County, see State and County QuickFacts: Genesee County, Michigan,
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/26049.html (last updated
Mar. 11, 2013, 2:14 PM). For Alger County, see State and County QuickFacts: Alger County,
Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/26003.html (last
updated Mar. 11, 2013, 2:14 PM). And for Marquette County, see State and County QuickFacts:
Marquette County, Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/
26103.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2013, 2:14 PM).
Readers conducting their own calculations will note that the actual result for hypothetical
absolute disparities for Wayne County is 18.135. Table 1 shows ranges when the result of the
calculation would result in a partial juror sitting on the hypothetical venire.
54. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365–66 (1979).
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occurred? In Duren, the Court noted the “gross discrepancy” between the
percentage of women in the community (54%) and the number of women
on jury venires (15%),55 but it did not provide any further guidance.56 Lower
courts have struggled with this question and have settled on a 10-percent-
age-point threshold to find that the underrepresentation of the group is suf-
ficiently significant to cause constitutional harm,57 but they have provided
very little reasoning beyond citing other courts to explain why this threshold
satisfies the fair cross-section requirement or serves its underlying
purposes.58
Thresholds are understandably attractive from the perspective of judicial
efficiency because they allow for consistent and predictable results, as rules
often do. While these benefits are apparent, the jury system is inherently
inefficient—perhaps intentionally so.59 It would certainly be efficient to
avoid the jury system altogether. Summary convictions by a judge or a jury
of state-sympathizers would also be efficient. But the Impartial Jury Clause
should bind the state when it is inclined to make judgments that undermine
the fairness of the proceeding to benefit its own goals, including the desire
for efficiency.
The use of thresholds and bright-line rules in conjunction with statisti-
cal tests is dangerous. It treats counties with very different demographic
compositions similarly. For example, the absolute-disparity test, as applied
with a 10-percentage-point threshold, is a blunt instrument that makes
claims particularly hard for defendants who reside in districts with small
minority populations.60 In Wayne County, where 40.3% of the population is
55. Id. at 365–66 & n.23.
56. See id. at 366.
57. United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] discrepancy of less
than ten percent alone is not enough to demonstrate unfair or unreasonable representation of
blacks on the venire.”); People v. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124, 138 (Mich. 2012) (“Courts have
generally required an absolute disparity of more than 10 percent to indicate that the represen-
tation of the distinct group was not fair and reasonable.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664 (2012).
58. See United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Thomas v.
Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir.
1999) (concluding that an absolute disparity of 2.97%, when the total black population was
4.86% and the representation on venires was only 1.89%, was not significant) (citing United
States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 648–49 (9th Cir. 1982) (accepting an absolute disparity of
7.7%)); United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Courts generally are
reluctant to find that second element of a prima facie Sixth Amendment case has been satisfied
when the absolute disparities are less than 10%.” (citing United States v. Rioux, 930 F. Supp.
1558, 1570 (D. Conn. 1995))); United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 955–56 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that an absolute disparity of 2.83% when the black population was 4.2% was
not sufficient).
59. Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“[The petit jury] guard[s] against
the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference of the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”).
60. Weaver, 267 F.3d at 242 (“[A]bsolute disparity . . . has its share of critics. Some
courts have found that the absolute disparity calculation ‘understates the systematic represen-
tative deficiencies’ in cases such as the one before us, where . . . the groups at issue comprise
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black, a defendant would only have a cognizable fair cross-section claim if
the percentage of black veniremembers in the venire dropped below 30.3%.
In Alger County, where the black population is small (6.9%) but not insig-
nificant, this 10% threshold would allow for the absence of any black
veniremembers without violating the fair cross-section requirement.
This result does not adequately protect the principles of the fair cross-
section requirement. In particular, it undermines the communal goals of
jury service. The test allows the jury-selection processes to eliminate entire
subsections of the community from master lists. As a result, the excluded
distinctive groups do not receive the educational benefits of jury service.
Further, a jury list that excludes an entire group—or a substantial propor-
tion, at least—from the community cannot yield a petit jury that fully repre-
sents the community’s values and judgments.61 Such a result simply cannot
fulfill the Constitution’s requirement of impartiality.
These inadequacies are not remedied by merely adjusting the threshold
to a different level. If a 10% threshold can effectively bar sizeable minority
groups from a fair cross-section claim, then a higher threshold would exac-
erbate the problem. Selecting a lower threshold, say 5%, would still tolerate
removing some distinctive groups from jury venires completely. For in-
stance, a defendant in a county where the black population is 4.9% would
never prevail in a fair cross-section claim, even if 0% of veniremembers were
black. This threshold does not capture the fact that the underrepresentation
in the venire is so severe that it has eliminated the possibility that the defen-
dant could have a member of the excluded distinctive group on his petit
jury. As a result, that jury would not adequately reflect the community’s
values and judgment, and the communal benefits of having a jury would be
lost.
Moreover, lower thresholds would exaggerate the underrepresentation
of larger distinctive groups. If the threshold were set at 1%, for example, it
might be better at protecting smaller minority groups, but it would allow for
recovery when the distinctive group is larger. Take Wayne County, for exam-
ple, where the black population is 40.3%. If 39.3% of veniremembers were
small percentages of the population.” (quoting United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 776 (8th
Cir. 1996))); United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jack-
man, 46 F.3d 1240, 1247 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he absolute numbers approach is of questionable
validity when applied to an underrepresented group that is a small percentage of the total
population, because an underrepresentation of such a group that can be ‘remedied’ by adding
only one or two members to a typical venire can lead to the selection of a large number of
venires in which members of the group are substantially underrepresented or even totally
absent.”); Re´, supra note 50, at 545. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged this deficiency
in Berghuis v. Smith and declined to adopt the 10% threshold proposed by Michigan to estab-
lish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section violation. 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1394 n.4 (2010).
The Court did not hold that one statistical threshold would satisfy the requirements of the fair
cross-section requirement. It instead held that the Sixth Circuit erred by holding that by apply-
ing a threshold, the Michigan courts had reached a decision that was “contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 1392 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
61. See infra Section I.B.
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black, then this would satisfy the 1-percentage-point threshold. There is,
however, a difference between eliminating or substantially reducing the
chance of seating members of a distinctive group on a petit jury and very
slightly reducing the defendant’s odds of a perfectly representative petit jury.
The fair cross-section does not demand that venires be mirror images of the
community.62
B. The Comparative-Disparity Test
A variation on the absolute-disparity test is the comparative-disparity
test, which some courts use. Courts calculate the comparative disparity by
dividing the absolute disparity by the percentage of the distinctive group in
the community.63 The equation for the comparative-disparity test, using the
notation from Section II.A above, is as follows:
To use the initial example, if the total black population is 15% of a
community’s total population and the representation of such persons on
venires is 5%, then the absolute disparity is 10 percentage points. The com-
parative disparity is the absolute disparity (10%) divided by the percentage
of the group in the community as a whole (15%), which is 66.7%.
The comparative disparity expresses the absolute disparity as a percent-
age of the distinctive group’s overall representation in the community. It
says, in the above example, that 66.7% of eligible black jurors were excluded
from the average venire. Table 2 below shows how the comparative-disparity
test calculates underrepresentation of distinctive groups in 45-person venires
in relation to the community as a whole.64
62. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (“It should also be emphasized that in
holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community
we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population.”).
63. Detre, supra note 50, at 1917–18.
64. For a comparison of the comparative-disparity results for other tests discussed in
this Note, see Table 6. In Table 2, for Wayne County, see State and County QuickFacts: Wayne
County, Michigan, supra note 53. For Genesee County, see State and County QuickFacts: Gene-
see County, Michigan, supra note 53. For Alger County, see State and County QuickFacts: Alger
County, Michigan, supra note 53. For Marquette County, see State and County QuickFacts:
Marquette County, Michigan, supra note 53. Please note that in Table 2, N/A signifies impossi-
ble results because it requires dividing zero by p.
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Table 2.





Blacks in the 
Community 
Absolute Disparity 
2% 5% 10% 20% 
Comparative Disparity 
Wayne County 40.3% 4.9% 12.4% 24.8% 49.6% 
Genesee County 20.9% 9.5% 23.9% 47.8% 95.7% 
Alger County 6.6% 30.3% 75.75% N/A N/A 
Marquette County 1.8% 111.1% N/A N/A N/A 
The test’s usefulness is limited because, despite providing meaningful
analysis for medium-sized distinctive groups, it fails do so when the distinc-
tive groups are large (95% of the population) or small (2% of the popula-
tion). And most federal courts of appeals reject the comparative-disparity
test for that reason.65 The comparative-disparity test is a particularly poor
indicator of underrepresentation because it tends to exaggerate under-
representation when the distinctive group’s representation in the commu-
nity is low.66 For example, a 2-percentage-point absolute disparity in Alger
County yields a 30.3% comparative disparity because the black population
in Alger County is a small percentage of the county’s total population. The
comparative-disparity test becomes more meaningful, however, when the
population of the distinctive group is larger, and it can be particularly mean-
ingful when the group comprises between 10% and 20% of the total com-
munity.67 Once the distinctive group’s population exceeds 20%, however, the
comparative-disparity test seems to underrepresent the extent of the
exclusion.
In addition to its limited usefulness at the margins, the comparative-
disparity test engenders two further problems. First, it is nearly impossible
to pick a clear threshold using the comparative-disparity test that works with
the unique circumstances of each jurisdiction. 68 It only measures how much
of the distinctive group has been eliminated from the community, not how
well the venire reflects the community as a whole. This may explain courts’
reluctance to use the comparative-disparity test.
65. E.g., Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hafen,
726 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit revisited the question in 1999 and declined
to adopt the comparative-disparity test. United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999).
66. Detre, supra note 50, at 1921–22.
67. See supra Table 2.
68. For example, in United States v. Weaver, when faced with 40.01% and 72.98% com-
parative-disparity figures for blacks and Hispanics respectively, the Third Circuit nonetheless
concluded that the venires were “fair and reasonable” because both groups were such a small
percentage of the community. 267 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Second, courts have been tempted to use the comparative-disparity test
in conjunction with the absolute-disparity test,69 but in practice they have
not successfully integrated the two tests. When courts attempt to use both
the absolute-disparity and comparative-disparity tests, they usually fall back
on the absolute-disparity test, concluding that the distinctive group is too
small.70 The two tests are difficult to harmonize because they produce out-
comes that are at odds with one another. Wayne County and Alger County
help illustrate this problem. If only 20.3% of veniremembers are black in
Wayne County, then absolute disparity between the black population in the
community and the percentage of black jurors is 20%,71 whereas the result-
ing comparative disparity is 49.6%.72 In Alger County, that same approxi-
mate comparative disparity of 50% would result if only 3.9% of
veniremembers were black73 (a 3% absolute-disparity).74 These two situa-
tions are very different in terms of the impact the underrepresentation
would have on the composition of the defendant’s petit jury. Rather than
relying on these faulty statistical tests, therefore, courts should focus on the
effect that the underrepresentative75 venire has on the defendant’s chances of
drawing a representative petit jury.76
C. The Standard-Deviation Test
Although the standard-deviation test is more statistically involved than
either the absolute-disparity test or the comparative-disparity test, it none-
theless provides very little help in determining whether a venire is fair and
reasonable in relation to the community. No court has adopted the stan-
dard-deviation test as the sole measure of Duren’s second prong.77 The test is
a better mechanism to measure the fair cross-section requirement’s third
prong: whether there has been systematic exclusion of a distinctive group in
the community. Yet, some courts, like the Michigan Supreme Court, use it as
69. E.g., United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798–99 (10th Cir. 2006) (considering
statistical evidence of both the comparative-disparity and absolute-disparity tests); Weaver, 267
F.3d at 243 (“Because we think that figures from both [the comparative-disparity and abso-
lute-disparity tests] inform the degree of underrepresentation, we will examine and consider
the results of both in order to obtain the most accurate picture possible.”).





75. “Underrepresentative” means a venire or petit jury with less than the expected
number of jurors of the distinctive group given the population of the community as a whole.
76. See Re´, supra note 50, at 546; see infra Section II.D.
77. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393 (2010) (citing United States v. Rioux, 97
F.3d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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one of the many tests they consult to evaluate the fairness and reasonable-
ness of the underrepresentation.78
The standard-deviation test employs a statistical technique known as
hypothesis testing.79 Specifically, the standard-deviation test is a hypothesis
test that compares one data set to a hypothesis.80 The aim of the test is to
ascertain whether the observed result is the result of random chance.81 In
this case, there were fewer black veniremembers than expected in compari-
son to the community.
To apply the standard-deviation test, a court must find three values: the
number of total veniremembers observed (n), the expected probability that a
veniremember is a member of the distinctive group (p), and the expected
probability that a veniremember is not a member of that group (1-p)82 The
standard deviation is the square root of the product of those three values.83
The common mathematical formulation of this equation is as follows:
To illustrate, take Wayne County, which has a black population of
40.3%. If there were 50 venires over a 6-month period, there would be 2,250
total veniremembers (50 · 45), of which 40.3% or 907 would be black if the
venires are perfectly representative of the community.84 The number of
venires observed, n, in this case is 50. The probability that a veniremember
would be black, p, is 40.3%, and the expected probability that they would
not be black (1-p) is 59.9%. Thus, the standard deviation is 3.468 (the
square root of 50 · 40.3% · 59.7%). Therefore, a venire that is within 1
standard deviation from the mean would have between 36.832% and
78. See People v. Smith, 615 N.W.2d 1, 9–10 (Mich. 2000).
79. A standard deviation is the yardstick by which statisticians measure variability
within a data set. The pattern of deviations from the mean is expressed through standard
deviations. See e.g., Standard Deviation, U. New Eng. Sch. Psychol. (2000), http://www.une
.edu.au/WebStat/unit_materials/c4_descriptive_statistics/standard_deviation.htm. In a binary
distribution, half of the data points lie on either side of the mean. This means that 68.2% of
the data points should lie within one standard deviation from the mean. The second standard
deviation includes 95.4% of the results. The third standard deviation captures 99.7% of the
results. Thus, two or three standard deviations from the mean are considered suspect. See, e.g.,
Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 113 (2d ed. 2001).
Consider the following example: If a data set reflects the results of flipping a coin twice,
where the result can either be heads or tails and where the set of 2 tosses is completed 1,000
times, then the expectation is that over time, half the results of the 2 tosses would be 1 heads
and 1 tails. One-quarter of the results would be 2 heads, and the final quarter would be 2 tails.
The expected mean is 50. If the results vary from the expected results, then there is cause to
believe that the coin is flawed in favor of one side or the other.
80. See David P. Doane & Lori E. Seward, Essential Statistics in Business and
Economics 321–28 (2008).
81. See Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 79, at 20–21.
82. Re´, supra note 50, at 549.
83. Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 79, at 115; Re´, supra note 50, at 549.
84. This expected number of black veniremembers is the “mean” for the purposes of
this discussion because that is expected to be the most common result.
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43.768% black veniremembers. A result that is more than two standard devi-
ations from the mean is considered statistically significant.85
Now, in the same county mentioned above, suppose court administra-
tors only observed 457 black veniremembers, yielding a 20.3% average rep-
resentation (457 divided by 2,250). To determine whether the observed
result deviates significantly from what one could expect in a well-function-
ing system, the court would need to find the test statistic (z), or the normal
random score. The test statistic measures the number of standard deviations
that the sample proportion is from the expected result. This measurement
provides a way to compare data sets. Find the test statistic by dividing the
difference between the observed number of black veniremembers and the
expected number of black veniremembers by the standard error, which is the
standard deviation divided by the square root of n:86
Continuing the example from above, if veniremembers were selected
from a representative master list, we would expect 907 black veniremembers
in 50 venires of 45 people (40.3% of 2,250). If the court clerk observes only
457 black veniremembers, then the total percentage of black veniremembers
for 20 venires is 20.3%. The standard deviation calculated above is 3.468.
Find the standard error by dividing the standard deviation (3.468) by the
square root of n, the number of observations (50). Therefore, the standard
error is 0.490. Find the test statistic (z) by dividing the difference between
40.3% and 20.3% by the standard error, 0.490.87 That result is -0.408. This
means that this particular set of venires would be 0.408 standard deviations
below the expected mean of 40.3% black veniremembers.
85. Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 79, at 113, 120. The Supreme Court has also
suggested that results that are two or more standard deviations from the mean are significant
in the equal protection context. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977).
86. Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 79, at 115.
87.
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The court would then take the test statistic, -0.408, and calculate the
standard normal cumulative distribution function. 88 The cumulative nor-
mal standard distribution is the probability that a random score will be less
than or equal to the test statistic. The standard normal cumulative distribu-
tion of -0.408 is 0.342%,89 meaning that there is only a 0.342% chance that
the observed disparity between the average venire and the community as a
whole happened by chance—a very unlikely result. In the employment dis-
crimination context, courts have suggested that when the observed result
only has a 5% chance of occurring randomly, it raises an inference that the
result is due to a discriminatory flaw in the selection system.90
The standard-deviation test is not a good method to determine whether
venires are fair and reasonable in relation to the community. Instead, the
results of the test answer the third Duren question: whether there is a flaw in
the venire-selection system that systematically excludes a distinctive group.91
The standard-deviation test provides an indication that the master list is bi-
ased.92 It is a test to analyze whether there are flaws in the selection system;
the test helps determine whether to reject the null hypothesis that the venire
reflects the community. The standard-deviation test reveals whether there is
a flaw in the system causing the underrepresentation and whether the un-
derrepresentative master lists are the result of random chance.93 If the under-
representation is not the result of random chance, then that suggests
systematic exclusion. Courts and commentators have properly concluded
that the standard-deviation test is not a proper test for the second prong,
which looks at the fairness and reasonableness of the venire in relation to the
community.94
D. The Disparity-of-Risk Test
Recently, the disparity-of-risk test has emerged as an alternative to the
three tests described above. Two scholars, Richard M. Re´ and Peter A. Detre,
advocate for courts’ use of the disparity-of-risk test instead of the existing
statistical methods,95 and recently, the Michigan Supreme Court became the
first court in the country to consider the disparity-of-risk test to determine
88. This can be done by using spreadsheet software like Microsoft Excel. The Excel
function is “=norm.s.dist(z, TRUE).” The “TRUE” value Excel function returns the cumulative
distribution, which reflects the likelihood of having 72 or fewer black veniremembers on 20
venires over the designated 6-month period.
89. See generally Doane & Seward, supra note 80.
90. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981).
91. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
92. Re´, supra note 50, at 550–51.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000); Re´,
supra note 50, at 549–51.
95. See Re´, supra note 50, at 535–40; Detre, supra note 50, at 1931–37.
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whether underrepresentation in the jury venire resulted in an unfair cross-
section of the community.96
Proponents of the disparity-of-risk test make two arguments in favor of
applying this test to determine whether the composition of a venire is fair
and reasonable in relation to that of the community. First, they argue that,
unlike the other measures of fairness and reasonableness, the disparity-of-
risk test measures how the underrepresentation in the venire has under-
mined impartiality of the defendant’s jury. It does so by measuring the
amount by which the defendant’s chance of having a representative petit
jury has decreased as a result of the underrepresentation on venires.97 Thus,
the test is a mechanism to determine whether the underrepresentation has
undermined the goal of the fair cross-section requirement: to ensure that the
defendant has an impartial jury. One of the markers of an impartial jury is
that it provides the defendant the opportunity to draw a representative petit
jury from a representative venire.98 The goal is not to ensure that the defen-
dant’s venire or petit jury includes one token member of each distinctive
group in the community.99 Rather, the Constitution’s fair cross-section re-
quirement seeks to eliminate defects in the process of summoning
veniremembers to serve on jury duty in a way that harms the defendant’s
ability to seat a fair and impartial petit jury.100 Proponents of the disparity-
of-risk test argue that this test measures the factor most relevant to serving
this goal.
Proponents of the disparity-of-risk test point out that unlike the abso-
lute-disparity and comparative-disparity tests, the disparity-of-risk test does
not distort the results when the representation in the community is either
very large or very small.101 The disparity-of-risk test is more complex than
the absolute-disparity test or the comparative-disparity test.
To calculate the disparity of risk, the first step is to determine the ex-
pected number (E(n)) of distinctive group members—in this case, black
veniremembers—that would be on a petit jury if randomly drawn from a
perfectly representative venire. One calculates this number by multiplying
the proportion of distinctive group members in the community by the num-
ber of people on the petit jury:102
96. People v. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124, 142–45 (Mich. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664
(2012).
97. See Detre, supra note 50, at 1930–32; Re´, supra note 50, at 537–38.
98. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Detre, supra note 50, at 1935–36.
102. For our purposes, the number of jurors on a petit jury will always be 12.
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When the resulting number is less than a whole number, such as 4.8,
one should round up to the nearest whole number. Round up if the number
is more than 0.5, and down if it is less than 0.5. 103 For example, if the
venires are perfectly representative in Wayne County, where the black popu-
lation is 40.3%, then the expected representation of black jurors on a ran-
domly selected 104 petit jury would be 5 (0.4 · 12 = 4.8 rounded up to 5).105
Next, calculate two probabilities. These are the probabilities, or “risks,”
of getting an underrepresentative jury—a jury with less than the expected
number of jurors of the distinctive group. First, calculate the risk that a
defendant would get an underrepresentative jury even if the master list were
perfect. Next, calculate the risk that the defendant would get an under-
representative jury given that the master list is underrepresentative.
One can calculate these probabilities using the cumulative binomial dis-
tribution function.106 Fortunately, it is not necessary to have a high-level
understanding of mathematics to calculate these probabilities; cumulative
103. Proponents of the disparity-of-risk test have used integers in their calculations.
See, e.g., Re´, supra note 50, at 539. The function used to calculate these probabilities uses
factorials. See id. To take a factorial of a decimal requires using a complex function called a
gamma function. See Gamma Function, Wolfram Math World, http://mathworld.wolfram
.com/GammaFunction.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2013). This raises an interesting question
about whether courts should round up or down as a normative matter. It also raises the
question of how courts should treat an expected number of 4.5.
104. Petit jurors are not randomly selected. This test—and the fair cross-section re-
quirement—does not take into account other variables, such as peremptory challenges or ju-
rors the court excuses for cause or hardship.
105. See supra Table 1.
106. The following is the binomial probability mass function, which provides the
probability of seating exactly x number of black petit jurors:
The above formula only provides a probability; one needs to sum the probabilities of seating
any number of black petit jurors less than the representative amount. Thus, one must apply an
adaptation of the cumulative binomial distribution function:
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binomial calculators are readily available online.107 To calculate the first
probability, use the cumulative binomial calculator and enter the expected
number of petit jurors from the distinctive group into the field usually called
“successes.” In Wayne County, where the black population is 40%, this
number is 4.8 (40% of 12). Then enter the “probability of success” (40%) of
getting 4.8 black petit jurors. Finally, enter 12 into the “trials” field to re-
present the 12 petit jurors. The first probability calculated is 44%, which
means that there is a 44% probability of drawing a petit jury with fewer than
5 jurors.108
Next, one can determine the probability of having a petit jury with
fewer than 5 black jurors when the average venire is underrepresentative. For
example, in Wayne County, the average venire had only 25% black
veniremembers—a 15% decrease from the expected percentage of black
veniremembers in a representative venire. Using the cumulative binomial
probability calculator, estimate the probability of getting fewer than 5 black
jurors given 25% representation (i.e., successes = 5; probability of success =
0.25; trials = 12). The second probability here is 84%, which means that
there is an 84% probability of drawing a petit jury with fewer than 5 black
jurors when the percentage of black veniremembers has decreased by 15%.109
Finally, calculate the difference between these two risks by subtracting
the risk of a bad outcome given a representative master list from the risk of a
bad outcome given an underrepresentative master list:
For those unfamiliar with mathematical terms, the sigma function (symbolized by S) adds all
of the probabilities of seating 0, 1, 2, and so on up to x-1 black petit jurors. X-1 is the highest
number of seated black petit jurors in an underrepresentative petit jury. So, if x is 4.8, then the
above formula determines the cumulative probability of seating 0 to 4 black petit jurors. To
avoid confusion, y replaces x in the probability formula because the y value changes for each
iteration to be summed up to the limit of x-1. To put it another way, y represents 0, 1, 2, and
so on up to x-1.
107. E.g., Cumulative Binomial Probability Calculator, DanielSoper.com, http://www
.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=71 (last visited May 17, 2013).
108.
109.
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In the Wayne County example from above, this calculation yields an
absolute disparity of risk of 40% (84% risk of getting less than 5 black jurors
from the underrepresentative master list minus a 44% risk of getting 5 black
jurors from a representative master list). 110 Table 3 below shows the risk of
drawing an underrepresentative petit jury when the jury list has no under-
representation and when there is underrepresentation by 5%, 10%, and
20%.111
Table 3.























Wayne County 40.3% 5 43.0% 57.4% 71.6% 92.3% 
Genesee County 20.9% 3 52.7% 70.4% 86.5% 100% 
Alger County 6.6% 1 42.4% 79.4% 100% 100% 
Using the probabilities calculated above, Table 4 shows the absolute dis-
parity-of-risk values when the venires are underrepresentative by 5%, 10%,
and 20%. This calculation is not limited to determining the defendant’s risk
of getting zero black veniremembers; it evaluates the risk of drawing fewer
than the expected number of black petit jurors from a perfectly representa-
tive venire.112 Contrary to the views of the Michigan Supreme Court and
110.
111. Marquette County is not included in Table 3 and the remaining Tables because the
expected number of black petit jurors is less than 1 and would result in uninformative values.
In Table 3, for Wayne County, see State and County QuickFacts: Wayne County, Michigan,
supra note 53. For Genesee County, see State and County QuickFacts: Genesee County, Michi-
gan, supra note 53. And for Alger County, see State and County QuickFacts: Alger County,
Michigan, supra note 53.
112. Detre notes that the further the number tested gets from the expected number of
black petit jurors, the greater the disparity of risk gets. Detre, supra note 50, at 1934. Detre
suggests that the disparity-of-risk test shows the extent of the injury and that the injury is
greatest when the risk is highest. See id. at 1933–34. Re´ limits his disparity-of-risk analysis to
the chance of drawing fewer than 1 or 2 black petit jurors from an underrepresentative venire.
See Re´, supra note 50, at 539. Re´ ultimately argues that the disparity-of-risk threshold should
focus on how the defendant’s chances of obtaining zero black petit jurors have been affected by
the underrepresentative venire, asserting that this is the most defendant-friendly approach. Id.
at 540 n.28. Citing Re´, the Michigan Supreme Court limited its inquiry into the disparity of
risk between the ideal and underrepresentative venires to a defendant’s chances of receiving no
black petit jurors. People v. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124, 144 n.100 (Mich. 2012) (“We consider
the disparity between the ideal risk and the actual risk for having no African Americans on a
randomly selected 12-person jury because it is the largest disparity. Thus, it represents where
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Re´,113 this is the best way to consider the effect that the venire’s under-
representation has on the petit jury. The question should not be whether the
defendant’s expectation of drawing at least one black petit juror was affected












Bias = 5%  
U?R  
Bias = 10% 
U?R 
Bias = 20% 
Wayne County 40.3% 14.4% 28.6% 49.3% 
Genesee County 20.9% 17.7% 33.8% 47.3% 
Alger County 6.6% 37.0% 57.6% 57.6% 
This analysis prompts the following question: Under the disparity-of-
risk test, what is the threshold to determine whether a venire is not a fair
and reasonable cross-section of the community at large? Detre, who first
proposed the use of the disparity-of-risk test, does not advocate for a partic-
ular threshold that would establish whether a venire is underrepresenta-
tive.115 Instead, he uses the 10% absolute-disparity threshold to illustrate
how the disparity-of-risk test would make up for the absolute-disparity test’s
shortcomings.116 Detre emphasizes, however, that 10% was a mere sugges-
tion and that courts should decide which normative line to draw to deter-
mine whether the underrepresentation in the venire is unfair and
unreasonable.117 He does not suggest that the line be drawn above a 10%
absolute disparity.118
the underrepresentation most affected the expectations of a particular result.” (citing Re´, supra
note 50, at 540 n.28)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664 (2012).
113. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 144 n.100; Re´, supra note 50, at 540 n.28.
114. To see a comparison between the disparity-of-risk results with other test results
discussed in this Note, see Table 6. In Table 4, for Wayne County, see State and County
QuickFacts: Wayne County, Michigan, supra note 53. For Genesee County, see State and County
QuickFacts: Genesee County, Michigan, supra note 53. And for Alger County, see State and
County QuickFacts: Alger County, Michigan, supra note 53.
115. See Detre, supra note 50, at 1936.
116. See id. at 1936–37. Unlike the absolute-disparity test, the disparity-of-risk test
would not break down when the proportion of distinctive members in the community was
very large or very small. Id.
117. Id. at 1937 (“Courts need not, however, adopt a thirty-seven percentage point line
for the disparity of risk measure simply because this figure corresponds to a ten percentage
point absolute disparity in a certain situation.”).
118. Id. (“Courts may find that an increased risk significantly lower than thirty-seven
percentage points substantially affects a defendant’s chances. . . . [T]his question must be left
to the courts to determine, preferably courts armed with accurate data concerning the impact
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Re´ and the Michigan Supreme Court set a threshold to determine when
the disparity-of-risk test results show that there has been legally significant
underrepresentation in the venire. Their argument is that the disparity-of-
risk test establishes the cause of the legal harm, namely an underrepresenta-
tive petit jury. Re´ therefore argues for a 50% threshold, like a preponderance
of the evidence standard, which “would parallel the commonplace legal rule
that claimants are entitled to no relief when they fail to show it is more likely
than not that they have been wronged.”119
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted Re´’s proposed 50% threshold.
The court found that if the disparities of risk exceed 50% percent, then the
underrepresentation is not fair and reasonable, failing the second prong of
Duren.120 The Michigan court reasoned that this is the “logical normative
line because when measuring a defendant’s probabilistic injuries, a risk dis-
parity of 50% or lower shows that, more likely than not, removing the un-
derrepresentation would not alter the composition of a defendant’s jury.”121
Looking back at Table 4, only a defendant in Alger County could obtain
relief when the black population was underrepresented on venires by 10%
and 20%. In Wayne County, even if absolute underrepresentation reached
20%, a defendant would not be able to successfully raise a fair cross-section
requirement under the disparity-of-risk test, even when it would satisfy the
maligned absolute-disparity test.
This result would also undermine the purposes of the fair cross-section
requirement: providing a check on governmental power, serving the com-
munitarian functions of the jury system, and allowing juries to reflect the
whole community’s values and judgments.122 Any test that would tolerate
the inadvertent elimination of one-fifth of the community is a poor check
on the government’s power because it does not work to constrain the gov-
ernment’s ability to “stack the deck” against the defendant. Such a test also
significantly undermines the defendant’s and the community’s confidence in
the verdict by setting such a high bar for what will count as under-
representative. Finally, it cannot properly reflect the community’s values and
that a given degree of underrepresentation would have on the defendant’s right to a jury
chosen from a fair cross-section of the community.”).
119. Id. at 542.
120. People v. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124, 144 (Mich. 2012) (“We believe the normative
line should be drawn at 50 percent. That is, disparities of risk that exceed 50 percent should be
deemed unfair and unreasonable.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664 (2012).
This opinion and Re´’s article could be improperly read to imply that the test asks whether the
defendant’s chances of seating one black petit juror were affected by the underrepresentation
in the venire. Cf. id. at 144 (“[W]hen considering the likelihood that a defendant’s 12–person
jury would contain no African–Americans the disparity of risk was 24.39 percent.”); Re´, supra
note 50, at 543 (“[The defendant’s] risk of drawing one or fewer distinctive group members
. . . does rise to a mathematically comparable extent, from 16% to 66%.”). In Bryant, however,
the expected number of black petit jurors was 1 because the black population of Kent County
was 8.25% (0.0825 · 12 = 0.99), Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 138. Properly applied, the inquiry
should use the expected number of black petit jurors, not 1, as the baseline.
121. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 144.
122. See supra Section I.B.
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judgments when so many people from the community are excluded. There-
fore, even though the disparity-of-risk test avoids some of the problems of
understating or overstating the degree of underrepresentation, given the
group’s size in comparison to the rest of the community as a whole,123 it
does little to protect defendants from underrepresentative petit juries drawn
from venires that most courts agree are underrepresentative.
Most importantly, proponents of the disparity-of-risk test incorrectly
understand what the test captures. Both Re´ and the Michigan Supreme
Court assert that a disparity of risk above 50% means that the risk of getting
an underrepresentative petit jury is probably related to the state’s bad ac-
tion—in this case, the systematic exclusion of black veniremembers.124 That
is an inaccurate description of what the disparity-of-risk results actually
mean.
The disparity-of-risk results merely show how the probabilities of draw-
ing representative or underrepresentative juries have changed. It does not
show how the underrepresentation in the venire caused underrepresentation
on the petit jury. The disparity of risk represents the change in all probable
jury outcomes. Section III.A focuses on how to find to what extent the risk
of seating an underrepresentative petit jury is caused by an underrepresenta-
tive venire.
This conceptual error is one that courts have committed and repeated in
the context of medical malpractice and the loss-of-chance doctrine.125
Courts employ statistical reasoning in medical malpractice cases when the
plaintiff claims that a doctor failed to diagnose or treat a condition sooner,
which led to a reduction in the chance of survival.126 For example, if a pa-
tient has a 40% chance of dying before a doctor commits medical malprac-
tice, and as a result of the malpractice, the patient’s risk of mortality
increases to 85%, it is often mistakenly argued that, because the patient’s
mortality rate has increased by 45%, there is only a 45% likelihood that
malpractice was the cause of an eventual death. But that is incorrect.127 In-
stead, to determine to what extent malpractice affected the outcome, look at
123. Detre, supra note 50, at 1935 (“Disparity of risk is not open to the criticisms that
have been leveled at the measures currently used by courts. This is not surprising, since those
criticisms were based on the fact that the measures did not always accurately reflect the under-
representation that the fair cross-section guarantee was concerned with in all cases: The criti-
cisms generally took the form of an example in which substantial underrepresentation seemed
self-evident, but the measure showed only a small disparity, or conversely, an example in
which the measure showed a large disparity despite seemingly minimal
underrepresentation.”).
124. See Bryant, 822 N.W.2d at 144 (Mich. 2012); Re´, supra note 50, at 541–44.
125. See generally Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the
Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 Rev. Litig. 369 (2005). The loss-of-chance theory in a medical
malpractice case looks at the plaintiff’s lost chance of survival as the harm in fact. Id. at 371. As
it was initially proposed, it would have required that the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of
the evidence (about 50%) that the defendant’s negligence caused that lost chance of survival.
Id.
126. Id. at 401.
127. Id.
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the relative change to determine the attributable risk.128 Malpractice was the
cause of 45% of the patient’s 85% risk of mortality; if the patient dies, there
will have been a 52% chance (0.45 divided by 0.85) that the death was the
result of malpractice. To put it another way, if there were 85 identical pa-
tients who died, malpractice would have caused the deaths in 52% or 44 of
those cases.129
The advantage of the disparity-of-risk test is that, in theory, it focuses
more directly on how the defendant’s chances of receiving an impartial
jury—that which the Constitution explicitly guarantees—have been affected
by the state’s wrongful conduct, namely systematically excluding members
of a distinctive group in the community. It is not, however, an appropriate
tool to determine whether the venires over time are fair and reasonable in
relation to the community because it is logically and legally flawed.
III. A Proposal to Improve Consideration of What
“Fair and Reasonable” Means for the Fair
Cross-Section Requirement
Each method used for determining whether the resulting under-
representation of a distinctive group due to systematic exclusion from jury
venires is fair and reasonable inadequately serves the purposes of the Impar-
tial Jury Clause. This Part proposes two alternatives to the four statistical
tests discussed in Part II. Section III.A argues that, to the extent that courts
and lawyers rely on statistical tests to analyze the second prong of the fair
cross-section requirement, they should use the comparative-disparity-of-risk
test because it is a better measure of whether underrepresentation in the
venires causes underrepresentation in the petit jury. Section III.B argues
that, given the inherent limitations of statistics in the judicial process, courts
should reorder the typical application of the Duren test and address the fair-
ness and reasonableness of underrepresentation after, rather than before,
they determine whether there has been systematic exclusion of a distinctive
group. Then, in addressing the fairness and reasonableness of the under-
representation as the final prong in the Duren test, courts may consider sta-
tistical measures but should rely on their discretion to determine the fairness
and reasonableness of the underrepresentation.
A. The Comparative-Disparity-of-Risk Test
Courts should use the comparative-disparity-of-risk test to determine
whether a defendant has shown that an underrepresentative venire is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the community. The disparity-of-risk test130
does not accurately reflect the effect that the underrepresentation of a dis-
tinctive group on the venire has on the petit jury, because the test mistakes
128. Id.
129. Id. at 374 n.21.
130. See supra Section II.D.
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the percentage of total jury probabilities for a percentage of the possibility of
drawing an underrepresentative jury and suggests that the test shows a
causal relationship between the underrepresentative venire and an under-
representative petit jury. Assuming there must be a causal link between un-
derrepresentation in the venire and underrepresentation on a petit jury to
satisfy the second prong of Duren,131 the most appropriate test should be a
test that this Note will refer to as the comparative-disparity-of-risk test. It is
a statistical test commonly used in the field of medical malpractice to prove
proximate causation when the plaintiff claims that the malpractice resulted
in a lost chance of survival.132 The comparative-disparity-of-risk test mea-
sures the likelihood that the state’s bad act—in this case, the systematic ex-
clusion of black jurors from jury lists—results in an unfavorable result,
namely an underrepresentative petit jury.
To calculate the comparative disparity of risk, use the disparity-of-risk
value found by subtracting the risk of drawing an underrepresentative jury
from a perfectly representative venire (r) from the risk of drawing an under-
representative petit jury from an underrepresentative venire (u) and then
dividing that difference by u. It is essential to divide by u to determine what
percentage of the probability of drawing an underrepresentative jury is at-
tributable to the underrepresentative venire:133
To use the example of Wayne County again, where the total black popu-
lation is 40.3%, one would expect for there to be 5 black petit jurors in a
perfectly representative petit jury. Using the cumulative binomial calculator,
find the chance of having fewer than 5 black petit jurors when they are
131. This assumption is supported by the text of the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing an
impartial jury and the purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. See supra Section I.B.
The core of the fair cross-section requirement is the premise that to ensure that a defendant
can select an impartial jury, he must be able to select petit jurors from a representative venire.
See Re´, supra note 50, at 537.
132. Cf. Noah, supra note 125, at 393–403 (discussing how courts find the “attributable
risk” to determine whether or not a doctor’s negligent failure to diagnose a disease probably
caused the ultimate injury—the lost chance of survival).
133. Cf. id. at 400 (noting that in medical malpractice cases, some courts mistakenly
assume that the absolute disparity of risk alone provides information about how the negli-
gence impacted the risk of mortality and suggesting that to identify the attributable risk re-
quires dividing the absolute disparity of risk by the risk of mortality after the defendant’s
negligence).
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drawn from a perfectly representative venire. That chance is 43%. If, how-
ever, only 30.3% of veniremembers are black (a 10% underrepresentative
venire), then the chance of drawing a petit jury with fewer than 5 black
jurors increases to 71.6%.134 The disparity between those two chances is
28.6%.135 To find whether the underrepresentation of the petit jury is the
result of the underrepresentation of the venire, divide that number, 28.6%,
by 71.6%, which is 39.9%.136 Therefore, there is a 39.9% probability that the
resulting underrepresentative petit jury was caused by the underrepresenta-
tion on the venire. Table 5 provides the results of the comparative-disparity-
of-risk test for Wayne, Genesee, and Alger Counties when the venires are



























Wayne County 40.3% 14.4% 25.1% 28.6% 39.9% 49.3% 53.4% 
Genesee County 20.9% 17.7% 25.1% 33.8% 39.1% 47.3% 47.3% 
Alger County 6.6% 37.0% 46.6% 57.6% 66.6% 57.6% 57.6% 
a — This is the same as the absolute disparity. For the purposes of consistency, however, it is represented here to conform 
to the comparative-disparity-of-risk equation. 
The advantages of applying the comparative-disparity-of-risk test are
similar to those articulated in support of the disparity-of-risk test, except
that the comparative-disparity-of-risk test does not contain a mathematical
error: the disparity-of-risk test confuses the reduced number of petit jury
compositions with the probability that the underrepresentativeness of the
venire caused that reduction. And unlike the standard-deviation test, which
134. Once again, use the cumulative binomial calculator. In this case, enter 30.3% in
the “probability of successes” field to indicate the chance of drawing a black veniremember, 5
in the “successes” field because that is the expected number of black jurors if the venire is
representative, and 12 in the “trials” field because there are 12 petit jurors:
135.
136.
137. “Underrepresentative” here means that the absolute disparity is equal to the per-
centage given. Thus, the venires have 5%, 10%, and 20% fewer black persons than the black
population of the county as a whole. To see a comparison between the comparative-disparity-
of-risk results with other test results discussed in this Note, see Table 6. In Table 5, for Wayne
County, see State and County QuickFacts: Wayne County, Michigan, supra note 53. For Genesee
County, see State and County QuickFacts: Genesee County, Michigan, supra note 53. And for
Alger County, see State and County QuickFacts: Alger County, Michigan, supra note 53.
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helps courts identify whether the master list itself is underrepresentative of
the community, 138 the comparative-disparity-of-risk test provides informa-
tion about whether that underrepresentation in the venires might have
caused the petit jury to be underrepresentative. The comparative-disparity-
of-risk test is the best statistical test considered to date because it looks at
how the defendant’s chances at a representative, impartial petit jury are af-
fected by problems with the venire and how substantial that effect is.
As with the other statistical tests discussed in this Note, this result raises
the following question: When does the comparative-disparity-of-risk test in-
dicate that the venire is not fair and reasonable in relation to the commu-
nity? A threshold based on the preponderance of the evidence standard, as
advocated by Re´139 and adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court,140 should
not be the constitutional test. That threshold suffers from the same
problems as the absolute-disparity test and all thresholds generally.141 The
preponderance threshold would not adequately protect the values embodied
in the fair cross-section requirement: it allows those summoning jurors to
exclude large segments of the community from jury service; it does not ade-
quately ensure community confidence in the outcome of verdicts; and it
diminishes the defendant’s chances of receiving an impartial jury.142
B. A Proposal Without Thresholds
1. Thresholds Should Be Abandoned
Neither courts, nor parties, nor statisticians can quantify fairness and
reasonableness. There is certainly a normative appeal in adopting a one-size-
138. See supra Section II.C.
139. Re´, supra note 50, at 542–44.
140. People v. Bryant, 822 N.W.2d 124, 144 (Mich. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 664
(2012).
141. See supra Section II.A.
142. If courts are going to use the comparative-disparity-of-risk test and impose a
threshold, the threshold could more closely reflect the substantial-factor test and the loss-of-
chance doctrine that are used in medical malpractice. The substantial-factor test relieves a
plaintiff of the nearly impossible burden of proving “but for” causation when there are a
variety of factors that could have decreased the plaintiff’s chances of survival. 22A Am. Jur. 2d
Death § 38 (2003). Twenty-five percent is the threshold courts use when applying the substan-
tial-factor test. See Noah, supra note 125, at 405. In other words, the plaintiff prevails if the
malpractice was about 25% likely to be the cause of the plaintiff’s earlier death. See id.
The substantial-factor test might be better at recognizing the inherent harm that results
from any proven systematic exclusion of distinctive group members because of its impact on
the defendant’s and community’s perceptions of the legitimacy of the verdict. But the substan-
tial-factor test also recognizes that there needs to be some causal link between the state’s bad
act and harm to the neutrality of the criminal process before overturning a conviction.
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fits-all approach to these cases,143 but bright-line thresholds treat communi-
ties that are demographically different exactly the same. Justice Stevens crys-
tallized the problem with all of these tests when he posed the following
question to the Michigan solicitor general during oral argument in Berghuis
v. Smith: “Should we treat all areas the same, depending [on] the disparity
between a jurisdiction which has only 3 or 4 percent of a minority [versus] a
jurisdiction where they have 30 or 40 percent?”144 Under a threshold system,
the same rule applies to Alger County, where the black population is 6.9%,
as Wayne County, where the black population is 40.3%. In Alger County, all
of the proposed tests, except for the comparative-disparity test, would allow
the government to exclude the entire black population from jury service
without committing a constitutional violation.145
That is, indeed, a troubling standard to accept if the fair cross-section
requirement means anything. And it was an issue that troubled many mem-
bers of the Court when it last considered the standards for the fair cross-
section claim.146 The United States is rapidly becoming a country without
majority and minority populations according to the most recent census
data.147 If the country is increasingly comprised of distinctive groups that fall
below these proposed thresholds, then the fair cross-section requirement
will cease to be a meaningful protection.
There is little justification for having courts and lawyers play with statis-
tical formulations when the task at hand is subjective. Courts and juries
regularly evaluate reasonableness without the aid of mathematical calcula-
tions. When assigning tort liability, judges and juries assess the reasonable-
ness of a defendant’s actions.148 Similarly, in criminal law, the extent of the
punishment often depends on what type of activity an objectively reasonable
person would have known could cause harm to others.149 In Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure jurisprudence, the reasonableness of an officer’s
143. Justice Scalia noted that very appeal in the oral argument in Berghuis v. Smith.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010) (No. 08-1402),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1402.pdf.
144. Id. at 7.
145. See supra Part II; supra Section III.A.
146. After hearing the Michigan solicitor general state that the standard in the lower
courts has been a 10% absolute disparity threshold, Justice Ginsburg remarked, “That would
mean that a district is free to just disregard all the people who are under 10 percent of the
population.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 9. Justice Sotomayor expressed
similar dismay: “Well, I don’t think that[ ] any court has suggested that the complete absence
of the protected group in that kind of number [under 10% of the population] wouldn’t give
rise to a fair representation claim.” Id. at 10–11.
147. E.g., Michael Cooper, Census Officials, Citing Increasing Diversity, Say U.S. Will Be
a ‘Plurality Nation’, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 2012, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/13/us/us-will-have-no-ethnic-majority-census-finds.html?_r=0.
148. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discussion
Draft) § 4 (1999) (“An actor is negligent in engaging in conduct if the actor does not exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances.”).
149. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 142 (5th ed. 2009) (defining
the mens rea for negligence as a deviation from the standard of a reasonable person).
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actions is the linchpin of the analysis.150 For each of these inquiries, courts
do not apply statistical formulas to arrive at their conclusions; they do what
judges do best: make judgments after carefully considering a variety of
factors.
Furthermore, courts are not good at applying math to legal principles.
Time and time again, in volume after volume of federal reporters, judges
and lawyers make a mess of statistical analysis, which consequently subverts
the goals of the relevant legal principles.151 The fair cross-section require-
ment should not also be subverted due to slavish adherence to statistical
thresholds.
2. A Proposal for Analyzing Whether the Underrepresentation in Venires
Is Fair and Reasonable in Relation to the Community
How should judges think about the fairness and reasonableness of un-
derrepresentation without thresholds? First, courts should move the fairness
and reasonableness prong to the end of the analysis so that the Duren test
reads as follows: (1) if a distinctive group in the community is (2) systemati-
cally excluded from venires, and (3) the venires are not fair and reasonable
in relation to the community, then the defendant has established a prima
facie case that a fair cross-section violation occurred. The standard-devia-
tion test may help courts determine whether the system for summoning
veniremembers systematically excludes a distinctive group.152
The Duren test should be altered in this way because switching the order
of the second and third prongs ensures that the fairness and reasonableness
inquiry is properly contextualized. If a county’s venire selection has already
been found to cause systematic exclusion, then that places the question of
whether such underrepresentation is fair and reasonable in a different light.
Then, the fairness and reasonableness inquiry ensures that the defendant
gets relief when it matters. In Berghuis v. Smith, the Court signaled that
courts may look to whether systematic exclusion has been proven before
considering the second prong of Duren.153 Lower courts should follow this
advice.
150. See, e.g., 1 Joshua Dressler & Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal
Procedure 79–80 (5th ed. 2010).
151. Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting Pol-
icy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 771 (2010) (arguing that
judges’ mathematical illiteracy has subverted the presumption of innocence in paternity cases,
improperly allocated risk error in securities fraud cases, and injected racial and gender bias
into DNA analysis and the assessment of damages in tort suits). Indeed, Justice Breyer ac-
knowledged his own struggle to understand and apply statistical analysis during the Berghuis
oral argument: “So you see why I—I’m at sea, as soon as you tell me to be a statistician. I even
got a book called Statistician for Lawyers. That didn’t help me very much.” Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 143, at 14.
152. See supra Section II.C.
153. See 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393–94 (2010); Natalie A. Pifer, Comment, Berghuis v.
Smith: Continuing Ambiguity in Fair-Cross-Section Claims, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1035, 1046
(2011).
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Second, statistics should only be one of several factors courts consider
when conducting the fairness and reasonableness inquiry. For some com-
munities, an exclusively statistical approach is strikingly incomplete.154
Rather than rely on statistics, judges should consider how a ruling honors
the principles embodied in the fair cross-section requirement as they relate
to the community in which the defendant is tried: jury impartiality, per-
ceived fairness, community participation, and representation of the commu-
nity’s values.155 This analysis would require judges to consider and respond
to the parties’ arguments about whether a failure to find a violation of the
fair cross-section requirement would threaten one or more of these
principles.
Third, once courts reach the fairness and reasonableness prong, they
should weigh the statistical evidence presented, consider the purposes of the
fair cross-section requirement, and make common-sense judgments about
the fairness of the underrepresentation. A judge should, when possible, con-
sider the various statistical tests, but she should not rest her decision on a
bright-line threshold. These tests provide the court with information to help
guide its judgment; the tests should not, however, determine the outcome.
The absolute-disparity test shows the extent to which venires do not reflect
the community.156 The comparative-disparity test clarifies how much of the
distinctive group’s population did not receive summonses for jury service as
a result of the systematic error.157 And the comparative-disparity-of-risk test
tells the judge the probability that the underrepresentative venire affected
the expected representativeness of the defendant’s petit jury if jurors are
randomly selected.158 The comparative-disparity-of-risk test is the best mea-
sure among the tests discussed in this Note. Courts should abandon the
disparity-of-risk test because it does not provide any useful information.159
For example, if Marquette County systematically—albeit inadver-
tently—excluded all of its black citizens from master lists, a judge could still
find a fair cross-section violation by noting that the complete or near elimi-
nation of the distinctive group, which makes up 1.9% of the community,
would undermine the community’s confidence in the verdict because the
jury would not fully reflect the community’s values and judgments. Moreo-
ver, the judge could conclude that the complete absence of black
veniremembers caused the defendant’s jury to be less impartial because of
154. See Devon Knowles, Note, From Chicken to Chignik: The Search for Jury Impartial-
ity in Rural Alaska Native Communities, 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 235, 252 (2005) (argu-
ing that the traditional methods for analyzing the second prong of the Duren test do not
adequately consider Alaska’s unique cultural and geographical divisions and, therefore, do not
give sufficient weight to the purpose of the fair cross-section requirement).
155. See supra Section I.B.
156. See supra Section II.A.
157. See supra Section II.B.
158. See supra Section III.A.
159. See supra Section II.D.
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the indirect effects that the mere possibility of having a black petit juror
could have on the outcome.160
This more comprehensive approach to judging a fair cross-section claim
is a standard, rather than a rule, and thus suffers and benefits from the
advantages and deficiencies judges and scholars often reference in the famil-
iar battle between rules and standards.161 But this Note posits that a constitu-
tional standard is more desirable in this context because a defendant’s
liberty is on the line, the communitarian values of the impartial jury are so
important, and the demographics of the United States are so different state
by state and county by county that a definitive rule would be insufficient to
account for these differences while simultaneously protecting the values of
the Impartial Jury Clause.
Conclusion
The fair cross-section requirement of the Impartial Jury Clause both
protects defendants from arbitrary exercises of government power and pre-
serves the most important principles of the criminal jury system. Courts
have used four statistical tests and thresholds to evaluate fair cross-section
claims, and in so doing, they have undermined the policy considerations of
the Impartial Jury Clause. The four tests—the absolute-disparity test, the
comparative-disparity test, the standard-deviation test, and the disparity-of-
risk test—are deficient because they all fail to protect those underlying prin-
ciples. Courts should instead use the comparative-disparity-of-risk test be-
cause it provides information about how a group’s underrepresentation on a
venire negatively impacts the composition of the petit jury. Fairness and
reasonableness, however, cannot be calculated or quantified. Courts should
abandon thresholds and instead make a finding about systematic exclusion
before engaging in what courts have always done: consider all the facts
presented, weigh the evidence, and make a well-considered judgment about
how the outcome fits within the Impartial Jury Clause.
160. See Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials 21 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16366, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w16366 (“[O]ur primary results imply that the black–white conviction gap declines by
an average of 16 percentage points in all trials in which there is at least one black member of
the jury pool.”).
161. E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Forward: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 passim (1992).
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Appendix162
Table 6.
















Wayne County 40.3% 
5% 12.4% 14.4% 25.1% 
10% 23.9% 28.6% 39.9% 
20% 75.75% 49.3% 53.4% 
Genesee County 20.9% 
5% 24.8% 17.7% 25.1% 
10% 47.8% 33.8% 39.1% 
20% N/A 47.3% 47.3% 
Alger County 6.6% 
5% 49.6% 37.0% 46.6% 
10% 95.7% 57.6% 66.6% 
20% N/A 57.6% 57.6% 
162. In Table 6, for Wayne County, see State and County QuickFacts: Wayne County,
Michigan, supra note 53. For Genesee County, see State and County QuickFacts: Genesee
County, Michigan, supra note 53. And for Alger County, see State and County QuickFacts: Alger
County, Michigan, supra note 53.
